The objective of this paper is to understand how markets self-organize around personalized trade relationships. The inspiration for this paper comes from ten years of research on market institutions in Africa.
1 Micro evidence from surveys of manufacturing firms and traders in various parts of the world shows that markets do not operate in the manner predicted by standard economic textbooks. Legal institutions are not important and courts are seldom used to enforce commercial contracts -partly because the amounts involved are small, partly because debtors have no assets to foreclose upon (e.g. Fafchamps 1996 , Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning, Isaksson, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Soderbom, Teal & Zeufack 2000 , Fafchamps & Minten 2001a , McMillan & Woodruff 1999b . Prevention is the dominant solution to contract enforcement problem; this generates efficiency losses (e.g. , Johnson, McMillan & Woodruff 2001 . Ex post renegotiation is the main dispute resolution mechanism. If renegotiation fails, breach of contract occurs and the relationship is severed. Similar findings are reported by McMillan & Woodruff (1999b) , Johnson, McMillan & Woodruff (2000) , Woodruff (1998) , and Johnson, McMillan & Woodruff (2002) for various parts of the world.
To simplify a bit, early markets can be described as a two-tier system, with a core of sophisticated firms and traders and a fringe of small enterprises. Fringe agents operate on a purely cash-and-carry basis, largely in an anonymous fashion, and leave no room to breach of contract (e.g. Fafchamps & Minten 2001a , McMillan & Woodruff 1999a . Core agents are in long-term relationships with each other. They offer supplier credit and warranty and place orders (e.g., Fafchamps (1997) ). The widespread existence of long term relationships between manufacturers and their suppliers and clients has, for instance, been noted in developed and developing economies alike (e.g. Lorenz 1988 , Aoki 1988 , Dore 1987 , Fukuyama 1995 , Stone, Levy & Paredes 1992 . Research by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, and economists has shown that reliance on interpersonal relations at early stages of market development is nearly universal (e.g. Hopkins 1973 , Greif 1993 , North 1990 , Meillassoux 1971 , Amselle 1977 , Jones 1959 , Bauer 1954 , Sahlins 1972 .
Detailed case studies conducted in several African countries suggest that the main reason why agents enter in long term trading relationship with suppliers and clients is to economize on screening costs and minimize breach of contract. Firms indeed realize that suppliers and clients differ in competence and honesty. Finding reliable commercial partners is difficult and costly. Once a reliable partner has been found, agents continue trading with him or her.
Core firms often are networked to each other in the sense that they interact outside business -in religious and family events as well as at sports events (e.g. Marris 1971 , Himbara 1994 , Fafchamps 2000 . Empirical results indicate that firms that are able to share information about clients and suppliers save on screening costs, identify reliable partners more easily, and can more readily switch among potential suppliers and clients (e.g. Fafchamps & Minten 1999 , Gabre-Madhin 1997 . Firms with better networks receive more supplier credit and are more profitable (e.g. Johnson, McMillan & Woodruff 2000 , Fafchamps & Minten 2002 , Fafchamps & Minten 2001b . These findings echo earlier work by other social scientists (e.g. Amselle 1977 , Meillassoux 1971 , Geertz, Geertz & Rosen 1979 .
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Although these features are most prominent in early markets, they have been observed in many different economies, irrespective of culture or legal history. Bernstein (1992) and Bernstein (1996) has described similar features among New York diamond traders and Mid-Western grain traders. Her findings mirror the work of Granovetter (1995) on the U.S. job market. Whenever some dimensions of exchange are not contractible, markets seem to gravitate naturally toward relational contracting. This is true, for instance, in employment contracts where long term personalized relationships are the norm. The same observation applies to consumer loyalty: once a satisfactory shop, brand, or restaurant have been found, consumers tend to purchase the same product or service over and over again. Manufacturing firms similarly source their inputs from the same suppliers year after year (Lorenz 1988) . Search for an alternative worker, restaurant, or supplier relies in part on experimentation and in part on information circulating through networks via informal conversation, recommendation letters, and business lunches.
Short of refusing to call these forms of exchange 'markets', one is forced to recognize that many real markets do not operate either like Walrasian markets with anonymous agents or like Diamond markets with random matching and exchange. This paper focuses on the conditions under which markets spontaneously organize around personalized exchange and take a two-tier structure. To this effect, we construct a model of search and contract enforcement inspired of Ghosh & Ray (1996) and Kranton (1996a) . We extend pervious work in three main directions: by analyzing transition dynamics; by allowing information sharing; and by deterring breach of contract without meta-punishment.
The main contribution of this paper is to clarify our understanding of what Greif (2001) and North (2001) have called the transition from personal to impersonal exchange. Similar ideas can be found in (e.g. Platteau 1994b , Platteau 1994a ) who speaks of the switch from personalized to generalized morality. According to these authors, the transition is essential to the development process because it enables economic agents to transcend the limits imposed by personal exchange. What remains unclear is how this shift takes place. Researchers usually assume that a coalition of traders emerges that imposes collective punishment upon those who breach contracts, either by colluding to exclude cheaters cit Greif (1993) , or by developing cultural and ethical norms that make punishment automatic (e.g. Greif 1994 , Platteau 1994b . In my years of empirical work on this issue, however, I have never come across such coalitions and collective punishments. In particular, I have not observed a single case of an agent being punished by others for dealing with someone who had previously breached a contract.
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This paper illustrates how personal exchange naturally emerges and develop in the form of relational contracting as a way to solve contract enforcement problems. This model is then used to identify possible conditions under which personal exchange can be transcended in a spontaneous and decentralized fashion. These conditions, inspired from years of fieldwork, are the sharing of information and a shift in beliefs regarding the motivation behind breach of contract. The usefulness of the model is to demonstrate precisely what kind of information must be shared and how it must be interpreted before impersonal exchange becomes possible. The resulting equilibrium resembles a standard reputational equilibrium as in Kandori (1992) , albeit without group coordination. Our analysis of transition dynamics shows that a switch to a reputational equilibrium can occur without any coordination, but is not possible at the outset. Taken together, these results provide the beginnings of a theory of spontaneous emergence of a modern market economy in the sense North has given to the word, that is, of the move from personal to impersonal exchange.
Section 1. The Model
The stylized economy we imagine borrows many features from road-side markets of poor countries. As in Ghosh & Ray (1996) , we assume that agents can be divided into competent and incompetent. Heterogeneity of agents and search costs make compliance with contractual obligations self-enforcing. Unlike Ramey & Watson (1999) , we assume away norms and other social institutions in selecting equilibria. A study of transition dynamics enables us to identify conditions under which personalized exchange can emerge spontaneously. By allowing for information sharing along pre-existing social networks, we show how information sharing helps certain groups to prosper. We also demonstrate that, when the screening of potential commercial partners is sufficiently costly, newcomers may find themselves excluded from contracting. Business then becomes monopolized by a social network, possibly sharing the same ethnic or religious affiliation (Taylor 2000) .
The payoff structure
Because the emphasis is on breach deterrence, the basic building block of the model is a contract. Agents can choose whether to contract or not. External contract enforcement is assumed inexistent.
4 To focus attention on breach deter-rence, we follow other authors (e.g. Milgrom, North & Weingast 1991 , Kandori 1992 , Greif 1993 , Kranton 1996a ) and abstract from price and quantity: the size of the transaction is fixed and the price is determined by market forces outside the model. 5 The payoff matrix of the contract has the form:
where a and b are the gains from contracting to the lef t and top player, respectively, with a < 1 and b < 1. There is continuum of agents, indexed from 0 to 1. Agents are of two types: competent and incompetent with proportions G and B = 1 − G. These proportions are constant and known to all agents, but an agent's type is not directly observable. Competent agents obtain positive gains from contracting if the contract is honored by both parties. So, for instance, if lef t and top are both competent, then a > 0, b > 0, and the contract is a standard two-sided prisoner's dilemma. Each party can increase its payoff by breaching the contract: the seller can cheat by failing to deliver or by delivering bad quality, while the buyer can cheat by failing to pay. Both, however, can increase their joint payoff by jointly honoring the contract. A joint compliance strategy may be thus supported in a repeated game with sufficiently patient agents. In contrast, incompetent agents obtain a negative payoff, e.g., a < 0, even if the contract is honored. Incompetent agents always cheat, even in a repeated game.
To simplify the algebra, the PD payoffs of competent agents are assumed to be symmetrical. Nothing important hinges on this assumption: similar results are obtained using a one-sided PD game (Fafchamps 2002) . If both parties cheat, their payoff is 0 -which is also their reservation payoff if they refuse to transact. Indeed, if the seller does not deliver and the buyer does not pay, nothing is exchanged which is equivalent to no transaction.
An alternative interpretation of the model is to let the contract represent trade with forward contracting (order, credit, warranty). Refusing to contract then represents cash-and-carry trade with no opportunity for breach. In this interpretation, incompetent agents are agents that cannot or would not honor contracts. If we normalize gains from cash-and-carry trade to be 0, the two interpretations are equivalent. Gains from contracting then represent reduction in transactions costs brought about by forward contracting. In the pages that follow, the first interpretation is used to simplify the presentation. But in practice, it is the second interpretation that is most relevant to our understanding problematic. There, courts are typically underfunded and subject to political pressures, markets are thin and transactions small, illiteracy and lack of education preclude the widespread use of written contractual instruments, and many economic agents are poor. Consequently, the threat of court action is unlikely to perfectly deter opportunistic breach, either because too many debtors are 'judgement-proof' in the sense that they have insufficient assets to repay their debts; or because court action is too costly and unpredictable for a plaintiff to sue (e.g. Ministere de la Justice 1999, Bigsten et al. 2000 , Fafchamps & Minten 2001a .
5 E.g., in the cash-and-carry market; see second interpretation below.
of core-fringe patterns in early markets and of the move from anonymous to personal to impersonal exchange. We revisit the second interpretation at the end of the paper.
The economy over time
Agents contract over time. Incompetent agents are replaced at the end of each period. 6 Competent agents are infinitely lived. They are risk neutral and have a common discount factor δ. In each period, an agent can contract at most once. A the beginning of each period, each unmatched agent is matched at random with one other unmatched agent. At the end of each period, agents can decide to remain matched with the same agent in the next period. If either wishes to become unmatched, they both become unmatched.
After they have been matched, agents have three choices: to contract, screen, or do nothing. If both decide to contract, their payoff matrix is as in (P). By incurring a cost c an agent can screen the other agent to learn his type.
7 This information cannot be used to contract in the current round; it can only be used in subsequent rounds. Since contracting is voluntary, if either agent decides to screen or do nothing, there is no contract. Screening, however, is not voluntary: a player does not have to agree to be screened. Actions are taken simultaneously so that agents cannot condition their action on that of the other player's.
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The above summarizes the main features of the model. Given suitable parameter values, the equilibrium resembles that of Ghosh & Ray (1996) : incompetent agents always offer to contract; competent agents screen when matched with an unknown agent; if screening reveals the other agent to be competent, agents choose to remain matched and contract in all subsequent periods. Failure to respect the contract in any period is punished by becoming unmatched and having to incur the screening cost and to wait for a new long-term partner.
Three complications are added to this basic set-up. First, we assume that, for reasons outside the scope of the model, agents become unmatched with 6 Without this assumption, all bad agents would eventually be known when information about agents circulates across networks. The justification for this assumption is that, in practice, incompetent agents are too numerous to be remembered and can easily conceal their identity, e.g., because there is no identity card system and businesses are not registerred. Entry and exit among fringe firms is also extremely high (e.g. Daniels 1994 , Barrett 1997 .
7 One possible interpretation of c is as the cost of assessing an agent's type directly. An alternative interpretation is to see c as the reduced form of a sequential 'starting small/building trust' game in which one agent seeks to assess the other agent's type by proposing progressively larger gain from defection (e.g. Watson 1999 , Rauch & Watson 1999 , Datta 1996 . In this case, if we only have two types, the screening cost is the minimum transaction that would induce an incompetent agent to reveal its type. We assume that agents cannot observe whether the other party has actually incurs the screening cost. Without this assumption, cheaters may be induced to reveal themselves by asking them to incur a screening cost, as is implicitly done in Milgrom, North & Weingast (1991) . Here, incompetent agents always agree to screen but never do.
8 It is never in the interest of incompetent agents to screen. If their screening action is observable, it can be used to infer type. This possibility is eliminated if actions are assumed simultaneous. If one agents wishes to screen while the second wishes to contract, the second agent does nothing. constant probability 1 − τ , even if they are in a long-term relationship.
9 We call these agents switchers. They arise because of shocks that affect contracting patterns. Their presence has an influence on the type of long-term equilibria that are possible in this economy.
Second, we assume that, with a constant probability 1 − θ (0 < θ ≤ 1), a competent agent goes bankrupt. For switchers and bankrupt agents, their payoff becomes α = 0. The only difference between the two is that a bankrupt agent drops out of the population and is replaced by a new, identical agent at the beginning of next period, while a switcher simply goes back to the pool of unmatched agents.
Agents learn whether they switch or go bankrupt after they have chosen to contract but before they comply with the contract. Since the news is revealed to agents before compliance, they are tempted to breach the contract.
10 Both assumptions play an important role in the type of equilibrium that can be sustained.
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Our third complication is about information sharing. Each agent i is endowed with a network of contacts measured by parameter κ i . This parameter measures the probability with which agent i obtains a costless and accurate report summarizing the past actions (not type) of the agent he has been matched with. Behind this assumption is the idea that agents are connected with people with whom they share information (e.g. Raub & Weesie 1990 , Kranton & Minehart 2001 , Bala & Goyal 2000 . We think of κ i as the result of social interaction outside business and take it to be predetermined and constant over time. Not all agents are equally connected, which explains why κ i varies across agents. The amount of information channeled through the network varies endogenously over time: since networks only disclose past actions, they can only reveal the type of agents who have ever contracted. Information circulates in both directions, so that κ i is also the proportion of agents who get a report on i. This is akin to assuming that networks are bidirectional: if an agent i can obtain a report on another agent j, then j can also obtain a report on i.
Beliefs and equilibrium concepts
By construction, incompetent agents have no strategic behavior. Their behavior can thus be ignored from the analysis. We focus exclusively on competent 9 E.g., changes in economic conditions and trade patterns. See Greif (1993) and Ghosh & Ray (1996) , section 4.2.1 for similar assumptions.
10 Alternatively, we could assume that agents learn that they switch or are going bankrupt at the beginning of the period. In this case, it is in their interest to contract intending to breach -what lawyers call fraud or fraudulent bankruptcy because it involves deception. In our model, premeditated and non-premeditated breaches turn out to be formally equivalent and the distinction is ignored. Our assumption is slightly more realistic in that, in equilibrium, breach does not involve deception.
11 It is also possible that an agent cannot fulfill a contract due to temporary circumstances beyond their control (e.g., fire, riot, flood). Such extraordinary circumstances may be ground for excusable default; they are ignored here. In other words, we abstract from efficient breaches (e.g., (e.g. Craswell 1995 , Cooter & Ulen 1988 ).
agents, who are forward looking and form expectations about the future. Expectations are formed regarding actions of other agents and about proportions of competent and incompetent agents among the unmatched. We assume these expectations to be rational, conditional on a specific equilibrium strategy being followed by all agents. As we will see shortly, transition dynamics depend critically on the proportion of competent agents among the unmatched. In general, this proportion is a stochastic variable, making the analysis of the model extremely cumbersome without adding any new insight. To keep things manageable, we assumed that the population of agents is infinite. This means that probabilities become proportions and that the proportion of competent agents among the unmatched is deterministic. In this case, rational expectation boils down to perfect foresight.
Agents are assumed to chose best responses to the strategies of other players. This in general implies satisfying a long list of individual rationality constraints. The class of equilibria we consider is similar to repeated game equilibria (e.g. Fudenberg & Maskin 1986 , Abreu, Pearce & Stacchetti 1990 . As is customary in this class of model, there is an infinity of possible equilibria. Here we focus exclusively on (constrained) efficient equilibria in which contractual compliance is sustained. We ignore equilibria in which agents choose not to cooperate even though cooperation could be sustained. Following Ghosh & Ray (1996) , we call this assumption the 'bilateral rationality condition', i.e., pairs of agent in a long-term relationship are assumed able to negotiate a coordinated switch to a mutual Pareto improvement, provided that doing so does not require the cooperation of others.
12 The advantage of this approach is that it focuses the attention on 'decentralizable' equilibria that do not require coordination across all agents. As we shall see later, some equilibria satisfy this condition while others, such as Kandori's reputational equilibria, do not. Combined with the payoff symmetry assumption, the bilateral rationality condition ensures that the efficient symmetric equilibrium is selected as the single solution to the repeated game that represents relational contracting. 
Relational strategies
We are now ready to begin the analysis. We first demonstrate the existence of what we call a relational equilibrium and we derive laws of motion for the economy. We reproduce earlier results that, in the presence of heterogeneous agents, the shunning of cheaters is not required for exchange to take place. Search frictions can serve to enforce contracts in the absence of community sanctions (e.g. Ramey & Watson 1999 , McMillan & Woodruff 1999a ). We also show that agents benefit from sharing information even if cheaters are not excluded from 12 This condition is a form of coalition-proofness condition (Bernheim, Peleg & Whinston 1987) .
13 As pointed out earlier, symmetry is not essential to our results but it facilitates presentation of the results. Equilibrium conditions impose restrictions on the way gains from cooperation can be shared. These restrictions are easiest to satisfy when gains from cooperation are shared equally. It is therefore natural to focus on the symmetric case as it sets the boundaries of the largest possible equilibrium set. future contracting. Perfect deterrence of opportunistic breaches of contract is nevertheless not achieved. We conclude the section with two special cases: a relational equilibrium with no information sharing; and a closed-shop equilibrium.
We seek to identify conditions under which a particular type of behavior, which we call relational strategies, are self-enforcing. We begin by defining relational strategies. Based on these strategies, we compute expected payoffs conditional upon the state agents are in. Next, we derive the laws of motion of the economy, given these strategies, and we derive the properties of the long term steady state. We then study the parameter configurations for which relational strategies are subgame perfect.
Let us define simple relational strategies as strategies in which two agents contract with each other until a breach of contract occurs, at which point they look for another partner. Within this broad class of strategies, we first consider one specific strategy that we denote Σ a . We show that, for some parameter values, it constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium and satisfies the bilateral rationality condition. Strategy Σ a is as follows:
Matching stage: At time t, an agent i offers to continue contracting with the agent j with whom i was matched in the previous round unless, at t − 1, (1) screening has revealed that j is incompetent; (2) a breach of contract occurred; or (3) i is a switcher. In all these cases, i and j seek new partners. New agents always seek a new partner.
Contractual stage: A competent agent i offers to contract with j if i has chosen to continue trading with j. If j is a new match, i offers to contract if the credit report shows that j has complied at least once in the past; otherwise i screens.
Compliance stage: A competent agent i complies with the contract unless i is a switcher or goes bankrupt, in which case i breaches the contract. Incompetent agents always breach.
Note that no stigma is attached to breach of contract and that, with probability 1, all competent agents eventually breach. Stigma is revisited in Section 3. We now investigate the conditions under which Σ a is a subgame perfect equilibrium, which we denote Φ a . Expected payoffs of incompetent agents are constant and are ignored from now on. Expected long term payoffs for competent agents are derived as follows. At the beginning of each period, competent agents are in one of three possible states: matched (M); tested and unmatched (U); or untested and unmatched (K). Matched agents are those who are in a long-term relationship. Tested agent are those that have been screened as competent; untested agents are those who have never been screened. There are three states in which a player can be at the end of the compliance stage: normal state, switcher, or bankrupt with probabilities τ θ, (1 − τ )θ, and 1 − θ, respectively. agent at the beginning of period t, respectively. We get:
( 1) The first part is the agent's instantaneous payoff times the probability that both agents comply. The second term is the expected continuation payoff if either of the two agents breaks up the relationship and they must find a new partner. The third term is the continuation payoff if the relationship continues. Equation (1) incorporates the fact that disappearing agents have a continuation payoff of 0. To simplify the notation, let τ 2 ≡ τ 2 θ, δ ≡ δθ, and α ≡ αθ. Equation (1) can then be rewritten more succinctly as:
To derive the expected payoff of unmatched agents, let I t be the proportion of tested agents at time t, a fraction K t of which are unmatched at the beginning of the period. Next, let U t stand for the fraction of untested, and thus unmatched, agents. By construction, G = I t + U t at all t. Let µ t be the proportion of untested agents among the unmatched, and let p t be the proportion of incompetent agents among the untested. By definition, we have:
The expected payoff of a tested unmatched agent V K t can then be written:
The first term represents the expected payoff from being matched with a known tested agent and trading from the start. This option is not open to untested agents because they are indistinguishable from incompetent agents and therefore never contract at their first encounter. The second and third terms are the expected payoff from being matched with an unknown but competent agent, and with an incompetent agent, respectively. The last term is the screening cost. A similar equation can be derived for untested agents:
If κ = 0, it is easy to verify that (2), (5) and (6) constitute a set of recursive equations that can be used to compute agents' payoffs provided we know µ t and p t . Since the number of agents is infinite, the laws of motion of K t and U t are given by:
The economy's laws of motion do not depend on κ i . This is because, unlike in Kranton (1996b) , social networks are not used to speed up the search for reliable commercial partners.
The economy starts with all agents in the untested, unmatched category, i.e., with U 0 = G, I 0 = 0, and K 0 = 0. The initial proportion µ 0 of untested agents in the population is equal to 1. Equations (7) and (8) constitute a selfcontained system of difference equations that describes the law of motion of µ t and p t over time. Let p * and µ * denote the steady state of this system. Linearizing these equations around p * and µ * , it can be verified that the system is locally stable and that it is approached monotonically from below. Numerical simulations further suggest that the system is globally stable and that K t increases monotonically over time.
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The properties of steady state expected payoffs are summarized in the following proposition. All proofs are given in appendix. Proposition 1 states that agents' payoffs are higher when gains from contracting α are larger, when they have a dense network of relations κ, and when relationships last longer (τ large). They are lower when screening costs c are high, the proportion of untested agents µ * is high, and the proportion of incompetent among the untested p * is high. The reason is that, the more incompetent agents there are in the economy, the more time competent agents waste (on average) trying to find a reliable trading partner. These results are comparable to Propositions 4 and 5 in Ghosh & Ray (1996) . Since the laws of motion of K t and U t do not depend on α, δ, c or κ, if follows that:
increase with α, δ, and κ and decrease with c.
Proposition 2 generalizes Proposition 1 by showing that important characteristics of the equilibrium around the steady state also hold during transitional dynamics. The Proposition implies that returns to social network capital are unambiguously positive: agents with a high κ i enjoy higher payoffs than those 15 If θ = 1 -competent agents are never renewed -the number of untested agents eventually tends to 0 and p * = 1: in the long run, untested agents are all incompetent. If θ < 1, the presence of newcomers among the unmatched ensures that p * remains below 1: a certain proportion of unmatched agents remains competent even in the long run. It can also be verified that p * and µ * increase with θ. Moreover, the proportion of competent agents among the unmatched falls with time and the product µtpt ≡ B B+U t +K t rises monotonically as initially untested agents progressively become known.
with low κ i during all trading rounds.
16 They do so because they can save on screening costs and contract immediately. The sharing of information thus improves market efficiency even though reputation is not used to stigmatize cheaters. This kind of reputation effect has been ignored in much of the theoretical literature because agent heterogeneity is typically not considered (e.g. Kandori 1992 , Greif 1993 , Milgrom, North & Weingast 1991 , Raub & Weesie 1990 , Ellison 1994 ). An immediate policy implication is that the welfare of market participants can be raised by favoring the circulation of market information among them. This can be accomplished in various ways, i.e., by creating a credit reference bureau, circulating information on potential workers, or fostering business associations and meetings. Identification of firms and agents, an essential ingredient of an information sharing system, can itself be facilitated by setting up a business registration system. The circulation of inaccurate or ill-intended information can itself be punished as defamation or fraud. However, as we shall demonstrate in the following pages, the circulation of information is not always beneficial.
Equilibrium conditions
We now examine the conditions for which Φ a is subgame perfect. Although many individual rationality conditions need to be satisfied, only three deserve to be investigated in detail:
17 continuation of relationship conditions (CR) that ensure that matched agents continue to contract with each other; breach deterrence conditions (BD) that ensure that contractual obligations are respected; and willingness to screen conditions (WS) that ensure that agents screen each other.
For CR to be satisfied, agents' payoffs must be higher when matched than unmatched, i.e.:
CR is always satisfied since unmatched agents incur the cost of identifying a reliable agent while matched agents do not. 18 Next, consider breach deterrence. In a relational equilibrium, opportunistic breach is deterred by the cost of screening new potential partners. For agents in the 'normal' state, the breach deterrence condition is:
which can be rewritten more simply as:
This condition cannot be satisfied unless V M t+1 is strictly larger than V K t+1 . For switchers and bankrupt agents, deterrence is ineffective. To deter willful breach by switchers, it would have to be true that:
which boils down to 1 ≤ 0, an impossibility. A similar impossibility is found for bankrupt agents since their have a zero continuation payoff. Breach by switchers cannot be fully deterred for two reasons. First, the economy does not stigmatize cheaters and cannot, therefore, penalize breaking-up agents above and beyond the loss that they already suffer from having to end a commercial relationship. This is true even though agents share information about each others through an informal reputation mechanism. Second, the economy is large enough that the chance that agents would be paired with the same agent again in the future is vanishingly small. If the number of agents was finite and sufficiently small, agents would worry that cheating some agents may seriously reduce their chances of finding a new commercial partner, a process that could, by itself, support cooperation (e.g. Kandori 1992 , Ellison 1994 ). This possibility is ignored here.
Let us now turn to willingness to screen conditions. First, it must be better for unmatched agents to screen unknown agents rather than withdraw from contracting altogether, i.e.:
Second, untested agents must prefer to screen now rather than waiting until next period:
(WS2U)
Finally, tested agents must prefer to screen now rather than wait until next period in the hope that they will be matched with a known agent and will not have to incur the screening cost:
which can be rewritten as:
If either of these conditions is violated, agents refuse to screen unknown agents. If the breach deterrence condition (BD) and the four willingness to screen conditions are satisfied, it can be verified that other individual rationality constraints are satisfied as well. Together, these conditions therefore define the set of model parameters for which the relational equilibrium Φ a is self-enforcing. They can be used to derive the following propositions. Part (i) is a consequence of the fact that breach by breaking-up agents cannot be deterred. Part (ii) follows from the fact that the breach deterrence condition is harder to satisfy when information is shared widely. The reason is again due to the absence of stigma: tested agents contract more easily when unmatched and are thus less penalized if they breach. The larger κ is, the easier it is to contract, and the harder it is to prevent opportunistic breach. Part (iii) is an immediate consequence of the breach deterrence condition: for a relational equilibrium to exist, agents must derive strictly positive expected gains from contracting, otherwise they have no incentive to preserve commercial relationships. In these circumstances, agents may naturally interpret gains from contracting as returns to their social capital in the form of commercial relationships and reputation (e.g. Fafchamps & Minten 2002 , Fafchamps & Minten 2001b . Part (iv) implies that, if screening is costless, it is always in an agent's interest to sample unknown firms in the hope of finding a suitable commercial partner. In this case, the only condition that is possibly binding is equation (BD). A contrario, if screening is costly, it may be better for agents to stop screening altogether or to wait until they are matched with a known firm. To illustrate what patterns of contracting may emerge in relational equilibria, two special cases are examined more in detail.
From Anonymous to Personal Exchange
In our preferred interpretation of the model, 'no contracting' means cash-andcarry trade with no scope for breach of contract. All that is required for cashand-carry trade is a currency and protection from theft. Cash-and-carry trade is anonymous but it is in general inefficient relative to contracting because of transactions costs. 19 We use the spontaneous emergence of relational contracting as a parable for the transition from anonymous to personal exchange that we discussed in the introduction.
Pure Relational Equilibria
We first investigate the conditions under which a relational equilibrium is selfemerging. Let κ i = 0 for all i and modify Σ a accordingly by instructing agents to screen all unknown agents. Call this a pure relational strategy Σ p , and denote the corresponding equilibrium Φ p . In the steady state, this equilibrium is very similar to what Greif (1993) call bilateral punishment strategies. 21 Values of α and c above the II and JJ lines ensure that a Φ p exists. It is easy to show that equilibrium conditions are more easily satisfied when relationships are stable (high τ ) and agents are patient (high δ).
Two shaded areas, A and B are of particular importance. For values of α and c in the B shaded area, equilibrium conditions are satisfied in the steady state but not at t 0 . The reason is that, at p 0 = B/(B + G), unmatched agents find each other easily and the penalty for breach of contract is not strong enough to induce compliance. The pure reputational equilibrium is sustainable and locally stable, but it cannot be reached from a no contracting situation. A
for all t, conditions (WS1K) and (WS2K) drop out. It is easy to verify that V U t and V M t unambiguously fall over time. The reason is that the proportion of incompetent agents among the unmatched, µtpt, increases with t: µt = 1 for all t and pt = B/(B + Ut) rises as agents, who initially are all unmatched, progressively identify commercial partners. Condition (WS2U) is thus always satisfied along the equilibrium path.
21 These can be derived algebraically by solving recursive equations (2), (5) and (6) for a fixed V M and V U , and replacing µt by its steady state value µ * . relation-based market fails to emerge even though, if it were there, it would be sustainable. Under these circumstances, an unanticipated shock to the economy that would break existing relationships between agents could permanently eliminate contracting.
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Shaded area A correspond to another scenario, one in which the development of personalized exchange initially satisfies equilibrium conditions, but eventually fails to satisfy V U t ≥ 0: as the number of competent agents among the unmatched falls, unmatched agents eventually find it too costly to sample each other and withdraw from the market. The reason is that, as p t rises, the cost of sampling c is no longer compensated by the hope of finding a reliable long-term partner. This means that, in this case, Σ a are not sustainable in the long run; a pure relational equilibrium does not exist. It is possible, however, to find other relational strategies that support contracting in the long run (see proof of Proposition 4). These results are summarized in the following proposition: History abounds with examples of trading relationships that resemble pure relational strategies, such as the spice and silk trade of the pre-industrial world (e.g., Braudel (1986) ); long distance cattle and kola trade in West Africa (e.g., Hopkins (1973) ); cattle trade in Kenya (e.g., Ensminger (1992)); or gold trade along the Zambezi river (e.g., Shillington (1989) ). These ancient patterns of trade have in common to be highly profitable (high α) and, if undisturbed, extremely stable over time (high τ ). Yet history suggests that they often are vulnerable to temporary trade disruptions in the sense that, once trading routes are disturbed by warfare or political turmoil, these routes are difficult to reestablish.
It is still possible to find examples of similar trade patterns in contemporary Africa (e.g., (e.g. Staatz 1979 , Meillassoux 1971 , Amselle 1977 , Jones 1959 ). One of the reasons is that the semi-legal nature of much cross-border African trade precludes recourse to courts. In addition, the small size of the transactions implies that suing is seldom an attractive option. The embryonic manufacturing sector of Ghana operates largely in the same manner Fafchamps (1996) . The reason appears to be that the Levantine businessmen who run much the country's manufacturing sector are prohibited by law to run trading businesses. As a result, they find themselves sandwiched between suppliers and clients from other ethnic groups with whom socialization and thus the exchange of information is problematic. Trade in illegal drugs is another contemporary example of a pattern of exchange essentially based on relational contracting: the illegal nature of the trade prevents the use of courts to enforce contracts while the fear of informants complicates the exchange of business information. Efforts by drug enforcement agencies to disrupt trade channels (e.g., by arresting dealers) in the hope of permanently stopping trade can be seen as an application of Proposition 4.4. As part 4.1 suggests, however, these efforts are bound to fail if gains from contracting are sufficiently large.
Closed-shop equilibria
Things are different when agents share information. To focus on an interesting special case, assume that θ = 1. To keep the notation simple, let κ = 1. In this case, equilibrium conditions simplify to:
plus (WS1K), (WS2U) and (WS1U). From Proposition 3(iv), we know that willingness to screen conditions are automatically satisfied when c = 0. It is then easy to verify that parameter values exist such that breach of contract can be deterred by Σ a strategies. When c > 0, however, condition (??) is impossible to satisfy for values of p t close enough to 1. In this case, Σ a are unsustainable in the long run. The reason is that tested agents cannot be convinced to incur screening cost c > 0 in order to sample untested agents when the latter are, in their great majority, incompetent. Tested agents prefer to limit their dealings to tested agents whom they can immediately trust. Since p t → 1 as t → ∞ when agents are not renewed, i.e., when θ = 1, we get the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If κ = 1, δ < 1, c > 0 and θ = 1, the Φ a equilibrium is unsustainable in the long run.
By extension, Φ a is unsustainable for θ or κ close enough to 1. This, however, does not imply that no contracting can ever occur between tested and untested agents. In early periods, the number of tested agents K t is small and competent agents U t constitute a large proportion of all untested agents. In this case, waiting to be matched with another tested agent would take too long; screening untested agents, even though it means incurring screening cost c, constitutes a more profitable alternative. This leads to the following proposition: The evolution of equilibrium payoffs implied by Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 2 . 23 The Proposition implies that, if screening is costly, firms are long lasting, and information circulates freely among them, then contracting takes a 'closed-shop' form: established firms deal only with other established firms and refuse to even consider unknown agents as potential partners. 24 The reason is that there are too few competent agents among unknown, untested agents and it would be too costly to identify them. In such a world, agents with no contracting history find it difficult if not impossible to be given a chance to prove themselves: the deck is stacked against newcomers. Possible real-life examples of such equilibria include, for instance, the difficulties that young inexperienced workers often encounter getting their first job, and the problems that startup companies face in qualifying for credit from banks and suppliers. Similar examples can be found in developing countries where a closely knit business community has a hold on a particular economic activity: e.g., the Chinese in Indonesia, the Asians in Kenya, or the whites in Zimbabwe. Proposition 6 suggests that this hold is strongest in societies where economic opportunities are unchanging over time (high τ ) and firms are long lasting (high θ).
A corollary of Proposition 6 is that setting up a mechanism to improve the circulation of business information among agents -such as a credit reference bureau -may result in excluding from contracting those firms that have not yet established a name for themselves. Allowing established firms to better exchange information among themselves indeed makes it easier for them to identify each other -and thus to economize on screening costs by waiting to be matched with each other. Empirical work on Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe manufacturing suggests that widespread circulation of information may indeed be detrimental to newcomers. The three countries differ greatly in the extent with which manufacturing firms exchange information. For reasons discussed earlier, Ghanaian manufacturers share little information. In contrast, Kenyan manufacturers, who are predominantly of Asian origin, informally exchange information among themselves. In addition to informal information sharing, Zimbabwe also has a credit reference bureau. Of these three countries, it is also the one which manufacturing appears the most closed to newcomers, especially 23 Figure 2 is the result of a computer simulation using the following parameter values: θ = 1, κ = 1, δ = 0.95, τ = 0.95, α = 0.3, c = 0.05, B = 2/3, G = 1/3.
24 A similar result is derived by Taylor (2000) using different assumptions and a static setup. Fafchamps (2000) . This evidence is only suggestive, given that it is based on a small number of case studies in three countries, but it is consistent with the idea that information sharing may hurt newcomers. This issue deserves further investigation.
Shunning and Collective Punishment
We have shown that contracting can take place without resorting to any coordinated punishment strategy. The value that agents attach to commercial relationships can be sufficient to deter breach of contract whenever agents are heterogeneous. Full deterrence is not achieved, however: switchers always cheat at the end of a relationship. Intuitively, better deterrence against switchers could be achieved if breach of contract leads permanent exclusion from contracting. Let permanent exclusion from future contracting be called 'shunning'. In this section, we examine the conditions under which shunning is self-enforcing without meta-punishment. Essential to this argument is the presence of bankrupt agents. If only switchers ever breach, it is very difficult to sustain a strategy in which they are excluded from future contracting. The reason is that switchers have demonstrated they are competent and all agents know that, in a relational equilibrium, agents only breach when they switch. Refusing to contract with a switcher is against one's interest. In contrast, if those who breach are all bankrupt agents, then it is not in anyone's interest to contract with them. From this reasoning, it is clear that shunning is sustainable if the proportion of bankrupt agents among those who breach is large enough.
25 This simple idea forms the basis for this section.
The effect of shunning on payoffs and incentives
We investigate strategies in which agents who breach contracts are permanently excluded from contracting -'shunned'. In this first sub-section we simply assume that shunning is a credible threat. This point is examined in detail in the next sub-section. We continue to assume that agents do not observe the other party's gains from contracting, even ex post. Since agents cannot verify the conditions of a breach, all breaches must be equally punished. Let us define relational strategies with shunning Σ s as strategies in which only incompetent and bankrupt agents cheat. Other agents, including switchers, never cheat. Cheaters are shunned: if they are matched with a competent agent who knows them, the agent refuses to contract with them. When matched with unknown agents, cheaters follow relational strategy Σ a . For the surplus, the strategy is identical to the simple relational strategy Σ a . Since there is less cheating, the following proposition obtains:
Proposition 7 Expected payoffs are higher when agents follow the relational strategy with shunning Σ s instead of the simple relational strategy Σ a .
Conditions for Σ s to form a subgame perfect equilibrium are largely unchanged, except for a new breach deterrence condition along the equilibrium path:
δV
where V C t+1 is the expected payoff to a one-time cheater. Manipulating equation (8) and combining it with payoff functions implied by Σ s yields the following proposition:
Proposition 8 (i) Relational strategies with shunning Σ s become more easily sustainable over time.
(ii) Relational strategies with shunning Σ s are more likely to be sustainable if κ is large for all agents.
The reason for Part (i) is simply that the gap between the expected payoff of a cheater V C t and that of a non-cheater V K t increases over time, hence making equation (8) easier to satisfy. The gap increases because the proportion of tested agents among the competent ones rises over time, making it difficult for cheaters to establish relationships with untested competent firms. Part (ii) follows from 25 When agents contract with multiple agents, breach of contract can lead all contract being recalled, thereby precipitating the firm's demise. This may serve as additional deterrent to breach of contract. A formalization of some of these arguments can be found in the literature on bank runs (e.g., Diamond & Dybvig (1983) ). This situation does not arise here since agents contract with at most one other agent.
the fact that deterrence is more effective when the probability of punishment is higher.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 8 is that shunning is ineffective with totally unconnected agents, that is, agents whose κ i = 0. Contracting with such agents is only feasible via simple relational strategies since knowledge about their actions never circulates. If agents differ with respect to their κ i , shunning may be feasible only within a closely-knit group. This opens the door to more complicated strategies whereby agents play a shunning strategy with certain agents and a simple relational strategy with others. For lack of space, we do not explore this possibility here. But it is consistent with the way Kenyan manufacturing firms interact: while Asian entrepreneurs share information with each other and refuse to deal with Asian cheaters, African entrepreneurs do not (e.g., Fafchamps, Biggs, Conning & Srivastava (1994) ). A similar contrast among various business groups could be observed in Zimbabwe (e.g., (e.g. Fafchamps, Pender & Robinson 1995 , Fafchamps 1997 ).
Proposition 8 implies that changing one's identity must be sufficiently costly for Σ s to result in a subgame perfect equilibrium. A shunning equilibrium cannot exist if agents who opportunistically breach a contract can subsequently hide among unknown agents. Shunning requires a precise way of identifying agents. In the absence of a formal identification system -e.g., business registration or an identity card system -shunning does not work. This may explain why the threat of shunning is largely ineffective against small, unregistered firms (the so-called 'informal sector') -and hence why transactions among informal sector firms remain quite unsophisticated. Interviews with entrepreneurs in Africa further suggest that running away to one's village -and resurfacing later with a different identity -is a widely used strategy to escape contractual obligations. Such strategies are typically not available to expatriate communities, a feature that may explain why shunning is easier among them and hence why breach is more easily deterred. This feature, by itself, could explain why expatriate communities dominate business in many agrarian societies of the Third World.
Finally, we note that Σ s shares essentially the same willingness to screen conditions as the simple relational equilibria discussed in Section 2. Consequently, Propositions 5 and 6 also apply. For instance, if c > 0, κ = 1, and θ = 1, established agents eventually refuse to contract with untested agents. Shunning does not preclude closed-shop equilibria.
Self-Enforcing Shunning
We now ask whether shunning cheaters is self-enforcing, that is, does not require that agents who contract with cheaters be themselves punished. We have already seen that shunning makes all equilibrium conditions easier to satisfy. The only problematic condition is agents' desire to punish. To show that Σ s is selfenforcing, we therefore need to show that an agent would not want to contract with a known cheater.
To this effect, suppose that strategy Σ s is followed by all agents. Consider a deviation whereby a former cheater i forms a relationship with a competent agent j. First consider the incentives i faces. Agent i cannot be deterred from breaching the contract if he becomes a switcher. This is because other agents continue to play the shunning strategy. Consequently, for i there is no penalty from breach other than the loss of relationship. Formally, condition BD" cannot be satisfied since δV C t cannot be greater than θ + δV C t .
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During the relationship, however, breach deterrence is easier with respect to i, i.e., V
This is because i has a harder time finding a new partner than non-cheaters, making a commercial relationship more valuable to i than to a non-cheater. Agent i can therefore credibly promise not to cheat again (except when switching) while at the same time credibly offering a bribe b such that i gets a cooperation payoff of α − b and agent j gets α + b. This reasoning shows that shunning cheaters is not self-enforcing whenever we allow side-payments.
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There is, however, one possible mechanism by which shunning can be selfenforcing. So far, we have postulated that, with probability 1 − θ, competent agents go bankrupt and are immediately replaced by new, untested competent agents. We now change this assumption and assume that these agents remain in the economy. Since these agents do not derive any gain from contracting, they have no incentive to honor contracts. Like incompetent agents, they take advantage of every opportunity to cheat but, unlike them, they have been 'tested' by the market and have a history of honored contracts. In a simple relational equilibrium Φ a , they could offer to contract with the tested agent they are matched with -and profit by cheating them. All they would have to do is to claim that their past cheating was due to switching. In a simple relational equilibrium, therefore, bankrupt agents would prefer to remain in the economy only to cheat others.
Things are different in a shunning equilibrium Φ s because agents do not contract with known cheaters. The threat of shunning deters cheating by all competent agents except bankrupt agents. In a shunning equilibrium, all cheaters are either incompetent or bankrupt and no competent agent should deal with them. Refusing to deal with cheaters is then self-enforcing and the threat of exclusion credible.
28
That Σ s is self-enforcing does not guarantee that Φ s is the only possible equilibrium configuration. Consider an agent who is matched with a known cheater. If all cheaters are going out of business, refusing to contracting is optimal. But if most cheaters are switchers, contracting is optimal. There will, therefore, be parameter configurations in which two rational expectations equilibria are possible, one in which agents believe cheaters to be bankrupt, in 26 The expected loss from breach of contract at the end of a relationship may, at least theoretically, discourage agents to deal with cheaters, but this is unlikely since the loss will happen only in some (possibly distant) time in the future. We do not pursue this possibility further.
27 Allowing for side payments may affect other aspects of the game as well. For instance, with side payments, a competent agent who is excluded from contracting in a closed-shop equilibrium could offer to pay for the screening cost. For lack of space, we assume such side-payments are not possible.
28 Agents may even be willing to pay a credit reference bureau for the names of cheaters.
which case competent agents never cheat; and one in which agents believe most cheaters to be switchers, in which case cheating by switchers is not deterred. 
From personal to impersonal exchange
We have seen in the previous section that all breach by competent agents can be deterred if shunning is possible. In this section we examine under what circumstances shunning may arise naturally. We see the spontaneous emergence of a shunning equilibrium as a parable for the transition between personal to impersonal exchange. The reason is that, without shunning, breach of contract always occur when agents switch. The more switching there is, the more breach. With too much switching, relational equilibria -personal exchange -unravel. Consequently, personal exchange cannot accommodate too much switching; flexibility must be restricted.
The situation is different with shunning. In this case, switching does not imply breach. The frequency of switching can therefore increase without endangering the equilibrium. With κ = 1 for all agents and a low proportion of incompetent agents, switching can occur very frequently without reducing deterrence. If we define impersonal exchange as one in which agents can switch freely between identifiable contracting partners, we see that a market can approach impersonal exchange provided (1) information flows freely about agents' types and actions -κ i = 1 for all i; (2) there are few incompetent agents in the economy (low search cost); and (3) breach by switchers is deterred. In this section we focus on the third requirement, which is the one that is most difficult to tackle.
The Emergence of Shunning
As is clear from the contrast between sections 2 and 3, information sharing is not a sufficient condition for shunning to be implementable in a decentralized manner -i.e., without meta-punishment. For shunning to be self-enforcing, agents must interpret breach as a signal of impending bankruptcy, as a type change from competent to incompetent. We now investigate the conditions under which the economy may switch spontaneously from simple reputationbased contracting to relational contracting with shunning Φ s .
We know from Proposition 8 that a Φ s is hard to get started: the presence of lots of untested firms in the economy makes it easy for cheaters to avoid immediate punishment. Exchange is therefore unlikely to take the form of a Φ s right from the start. The question then arises: could an economy naturally evolve from a Φ a into a Φ s ? We know that a Φ s gets more easily sustainable as the proportion of established agents among the unmatched rises over time (Proposition 8). Therefore, even if the conditions for a Φ s are not initially be satisfied, they may eventually become so. This can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that Φ s conditions are not satisfied at t 0 and that the economy follows simple reputation-based contracting -the Φ s path. Assume further that, as p t rises, Φ s conditions -and in particular the breach deterrence condition BD" -become satisfied at t 1 . It follows from Proposition 8 that they are also satisfied for all t ≥ t 1 . By Proposition 9(ii), however, we know that the economy may not automatically switch to the superior Φ s because multiple equilibria are possible.
How can the switch to the superior equilibrium take place then? One possibility is for agents to coordinate their actions. Once agents agree not to contract with cheaters, breach of contract is prevented and, from Proposition 9(ii), the Φ s equilibrium is self-enforcing. How such a coordinated change of strategy can be achieved is unclear, however. In their detailed study of a Moroccan market in the 1950's, Geertz, Geertz & Rosen (1979) reports that religious authorities and business leaders play an important role in defining norms of acceptable commercial conduct and in sanctioning deviations. Such institutions could possibly use their moral authority to promote the switch to higher standards of business ethics and favor the shunning of opportunistic breach of contract. Another possibility is that agents might get so aggravated at being cheated that they threaten all their business acquaintances with commercial and social retaliation if they deal with cheaters. Although such an action is not rational, it may be sufficient to trigger the switch to a Φ s . The belief that opportunistic breach of contract results in ostracism is easier to generate if members of the group feel a sense of moral outrage towards breach of commercial contracts. This feature may help explain why social norms in general -and religion in particular -play an important role in market emergence (e.g. Platteau 1994b , Platteau 1994a , Greif 1993 , Greif 1994 , Geertz, Geertz & Rosen 1979 , Ensminger 1992 .
The problem with the above is that it requires a coordination mechanism. Can the transition from Φ a to Φ s also take place in a spontaneous, decentralized manner? For this to happen, it would have to be true the proportion of bankrupt firms among cheaters rises over time so that contracting with cheaters no longer is in agents' interest. In a Φ a equilibrium, there are two types of cheaters: bankrupt agents and switchers. Switchers should be contracted with, bankrupt agents should not. Remember that agents cannot tell switchers apart from those going bankrupt. If bankrupt agents represent a high enough proportion of cheaters, agents will refuse to deal with all cheaters. To show this formally, let D t be number of agents going out of business but still present in the economy, and let d t denote their proportion among the unmatched, i.e.:
Define d * t as the value of d t that would make agents indifferent between trading and not trading with cheaters. If, somewhere along the Φ a equilibrium path, the actual proportion of bankrupt agents d t rises above d * t , agents will refuse to contract with known cheaters. If this moment arises at t ≥ t 1 (see Proposition 9), the economy switches from the Φ a to the superior Φ s . The change occurs suddenly but in a decentralized manner.
To illustrate this possibility, suppose that bankrupt agents never leave the economy:
This assumption is unrealistic but it is made for the sake of illustration. It is then possible to show that the economy eventually switches from a Φ a to a Φ s equilibrium: An economy may also spontaneously switch from a Φ a to a Φ s if it is hit by an unexpected shock that suddenly drives a large proportion of competent agents out of business -e.g, a major recession, or structural adjustment. By abruptly raising d t , such a shock may induce agents to revise their interpretation of breach of contract and now see it as a sign of impending bankruptcy, hence refusing to deal with known breachers. Once this change of inference is internalized by all agents, it yields a shift in what Greif (1994) calls cultural beliefs and Platteau (1994b) moral norms. If this interpretation is correct, expectations about the market behavior of other agents could be interpreted as the result of an endogenous market formation process, not as the product of extra-economic social factors. This issue deserves further research.
Conclusion
Approaching exchange from the angle of contract enforcement, we have examined the transition from anonymous to personal to impersonal exchange. Inspired from years of empirical research on market institutions, the model we construct equates anonymous exchange with cash-and-carry transactions. These transactions leave no room for breach of contract and therefore require no market institution other than currency and protection from theft. Cash-andcarry transactions, however, have high transactions costs and are particularly cumbersome for large businesses (no invoicing, no payment by check, no order, no warranty, quality inspection on the spot, etc). To lower transactions costs, agents must be able to contract, that is, to make promises that can be breached. For credit and insurance, inability to contract leads to market failure since cash-and-carry transactions are by definition impossible. Our model covers both situations in a stylized manner.
We revisited Ghosh and Ray's (1996) key result that, in the presence of heterogenous agents, agents' desire to avoid search costs can deter breach of contract. Deterrence, however, is not perfect in the sense that breach by 'switchers' cannot be prevented. The resulting equilibrium is characterized by repeated contracting between identical agents, something we call personal exchange. We examine the conditions required for personal exchange to emerge 'spontaneously', that is, without the need for coordination among more than two agents at a time. Gains from contracting must be higher to initiate personal exchange than to sustain it in the long run.
We examined the role of information sharing and showed that it reduces the need for screening but lowers deterrence. When agents are heterogenous, two types of information must be distinguished: information about revealed types and information about breach. In a personal exchange equilibrium, information about breach is not used by agents. This is because we rule out the existence of meta-punishments, never having observed them in practice. In the presence of screening costs, sharing information about types may lead agents to refuse screening unknown agents, thereby resulting in a closed-shop equilibrium in which newcomers are excluded from contracting. We showed that such an outcome is more likely if agents are long-lived and opportunities to contract are stationary -as is often the case for agricultural and other primary products. We interpreted this result as throwing light on the well documented existence of closely knit business communities or networks the world over. Contrary to what one might expect, wider circulation of information about types -e.g., via a credit bureau -does not eliminate the problem; it only makes it worse (Fafchamps 1997) ).
We then examined the progression from personal to impersonal exchange. In the context of our model, we equate impersonal exchange with agents' ability to switch partners with little or no penalty. We show that, for the transition to take place, breach by switchers must be deterred. In order to this to occur in a decentralized fashion, a shift in beliefs must take place by which agents interpret breach predominantly as a sign of impending bankruptcy. As a result, agents refuse to contract with those who breach, even in the absence of metapunishment. Exclusion of cheaters from future contracting is unlikely at early stages of market development. It also requires widespread information sharing. We speculate that what triggers a switch in beliefs may be a coordination mechanism or an external shock. U t , we get:
(1 − δ)(1 − δpτ 2 ) Plugging the above into the two equilibrium conditions and solving for α and c, we get:
The two lines intersect at α * = 1−δτ 2 τ and c * = δ(1 − p)τ 3 . It is easy to verify that the shape of the sustainable set is as depicted in Figure 1 where the JJ and II lines represent the two above equations. This proves part (i).
To show part (ii), note that ∂α/∂τ ≤ 0 and ∂α/∂δ ≤ 0 in both equations. Higher values of τ and δ thus shift both II and JJ downward, making it easier for a T BE to be sustainable.
To show part (iii), it suffices to show that II and JJ shift over time as shown in Figure 1 . This can be demonstrated with the following recursive argument. Let T be the time at which V This is not the end of the story, however. If Sigma c strategies are followed indefinitely until all competent agents have been tested and p = 1, the steady state value of V U will be:
which, for c > 0, violates the V U t ≥ 0 equilibrium condition. This implies that there is yet another time, say t * * , beyond which V U t falls below 0. Beyond that point, untested agents find it too risky to screen each other and the population of untested agents remains constant. The economy then operates in a closed-shop relational equilibrium: only tested agents contract with each other; untested agents remain excluded permanently. If V U 0 < 0, competent agents, who by assumption are all untested in period 0, never transact, never acquire reputation, and a relational equilibrium does not exist. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7:
When all agents follow a SARS, payoffs are as follows:
(18)
The laws of motion of U t , K t , µ t and p t are unchanged. It is immediately apparent that less cheating leads to higher payoffs: τ θ − 1 2 ≥ τ 2 , with strict inequality if τ or θ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 8:
We begin by noting that cheaters can continue to contract with agents who did not find out about their dishonest behavior. Their expected payoffs when unmatched V C t and matched V N t are thus:
The above equations take into account the fact that one-time cheaters subsequently follow simple relational strategies. Because cheaters cannot contract with agents who know about their cheating, their expected payoff is lower than that of untested agents, i.e. V 
Proof of Proposition 10:
Note first that the laws of motion of K t and U t -and thus µ t and p t -are the same along SRE's and Φ s 's. Consider the choice of an SRE agent faced with a known agent. Since in a SRE cheating is not deterred at the end of a relationship, known agents tend to all have cheated at some moment in the past. (Strictly speaking, not all K t agents have breached contracts. They may be in the pool of unmatched agents because they themselves were cheated by another agent. We skip this detail for the sake of clarity. This omission has no influence on the proof.) It is rational for the agent to contract with the known cheater iff:
which can be rewritten:
Clearly, in a SRE, if d t = 0, equation (23) To show part (ii), note that D 0 = 0 implies that d 0 = 0. Since D t increases without bounds, lim t→∞ d t = 1. Over time, d t thus increases monotonically from 0 to 1. Part (ii) then follows from Part (i). To show Part (iii), simply note that if t 1 > t 2 , the SRE will collapse before conditions are satisfied for a Φ s to take over. If, in contrast, t 1 ≤ t 2 , agents will stop dealing with known cheaters at a time when this refusal deters cheating without endangering contracting.
